The
US Department of State has known for decades that inadequate security
at embassies and consulates worldwide could lead to tragedy, but senior
officials ignored the warnings and left some of America’s most dangerous
diplomatic posts vulnerable to attack, according to an internal
government report obtained exclusively by Al Jazeera’s Investigative
Unit.
The report by an independent panel of
five security and intelligence experts describes how the September 11,
2012, attack on the US Special Mission in Benghazi, Libya, which left
Ambassador J Christopher Stevens and three other Americans dead,
exploited the State Department’s failure to address serious security
concerns at diplomatic facilities in high-risk areas.
Among the most damning assessments, the
panel concluded that the State Department’s failure to identify
worsening conditions in Libya and exemptions from security regulations
at the US Special Mission contributed to the tragedy in Benghazi.
Undersecretary for Management Patrick Kennedy approved using Benghazi as
a temporary post despite its significant vulnerabilities, according to
an internal State Department document included with the report.
The panel cataloged a series of failures
by State Department officials to address security issues and concluded
that many Foreign Service officers are unclear about who is in charge of
security.
Among the problems Sullivan’s panel identified in the report:
• The State Department’s
management of its security structure has led to blurred authority and a
serious lack of accountability. The undersecretary for management
oversees security issues while also handling many other
responsibilities. A newly created undersecretary for diplomatic security
would allow the State Department to better focus on security issues
affecting diplomatic posts around the world, according to the report.
Left unaddressed, the control problem “could contribute to future
security management failures, such as those that occurred in Benghazi.”
• The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, the State Department security arm created following the 1983
bombings of the US Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, does not have a
review process in place to learn from previous security failures.
Inexplicably, Diplomatic Security officials never conducted what is
known as a “hot wash” debriefing of Benghazi survivors to learn from
their experience.
• No risk management model
exists to determine whether high-threat posts, such as the one in
Benghazi, are necessary given the danger to US officials. Risk decisions
are made based on “experience and intuition,” not established
professional guidelines.
• None of the five high-risk
diplomatic facilities the panel visited in the Middle East and Africa
had an intelligence analyst on staff, described as a “critical” need.
• Diplomatic security training
is inadequate, with no designated facility available to train agents to
work at high-risk diplomatic posts.
• Even low-risk diplomatic
posts are vulnerable. The Obama administration, concerned about
potential attacks, ordered the closure of diplomatic posts in the Middle
East and North Africa in August 2013. Of the 19 posts closed, only four
were designated as high threat.
Sullivan’s panel noted that its findings
and recommendations are not new to State Department officials. A 1999
report by government contractor Booz Allen Hamilton recommended similar
reforms, including an undersecretary for security. Madeleine Albright,
then the secretary of state, approved the recommendation – but it was
never implemented. “This report,” the panel wrote, “was largely ignored
by the Department.”
Even when the State Department has
enacted security reforms, agency officials have failed to comply with
them or otherwise have exempted themselves from the new standards,
Sullivan’s panel determined.
Following the 1983 Beirut bombings, for
example, the State Department implemented building safety standards for
missions in high-risk areas, which became known as Inman standards,
developed by a review panel headed by Bobby R Inman, the former director
of the National Security Agency.
“Thirty years later, neither the US
Embassy chancery in Beirut nor a significant number of other US
diplomatic facilities in areas designated as ‘high threat’ meet Inman
standards,” Sullivan’s panel wrote.
Security problems at diplomatic posts
aren’t isolated, the panel said, pointing out that safety concerns can
be found at US facilities worldwide. For decades, the State Department
has failed to address these vulnerabilities, the panel said, suggesting
that Benghazi was a tragedy that might have been avoided.
Security standards exempted
At best, security at the US Special
Mission in Benghazi was porous. The mission took lease of a 13-acre
walled compound on June 21, 2011, two months before the ouster of Libyan
leader Muammar Gaddafi and after the shuttering of the US Embassy in
Tripoli due to increased fighting in the capital.
Explosions target Benghazi judicial buildings
Although the State Department reopened
the embassy on Sept. 22, 2011, the Special Mission in Benghazi remained
open despite serious security concerns. In December 2011, Undersecretary
for Management Kennedy approved a one-year extension of the Benghazi
post.
A career diplomat, Kennedy was aware of
the security problems in Benghazi. The number of Diplomatic Security
officers there ranged from five to as few as one, and security was
augmented by the February 17 Brigade, a ragtag group of Libyan militants
who at the time of the 2012 attack were working under an expired
contract and complaining about poor pay and long hours. In addition, the
US Special Mission did not have adequate barriers to slow a ground
assault.
“Benghazi has demonstrated yet again the
vulnerability of US facilities in countries where there is a
willingness to protect US interests, but very little capacity to do so,”
the panel wrote.
The Benghazi post’s failure to meet
security standards did not prevent its operation. State Department
officials effectively waived the security requirements. For years, the
State Department has fostered a culture of waiving such requirements
when officials choose not to meet them.
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